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BS EN 62351-9:2017

$215.11

Power systems management and associated information exchange. Data and communications security – Cyber security key management for power system equipment

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2017 94
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This part of IEC 62351 specifies cryptographic key management, namely how to generate, distribute, revoke, and handle public-key certificates and cryptographic keys to protect digital data and its communication. Included in the scope is the handling of asymmetric keys (e.g. private keys and public-key certificates), as well as symmetric keys for groups (GDOI).

This part of IEC 62351 assumes that other standards have already chosen the type of keys and cryptography that will be utilized, since the cryptography algorithms and key materials chosen will be typically mandated by an organization’s own local security policies and by the need to be compliant with other international standards. This document therefore specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography infrastructures. The objective is to define requirements and technologies to achieve interoperability of key management.

The purpose of this part of IEC 62351 is to guarantee interoperability among different vendors by specifying or limiting key management options to be used. This document assumes that the reader understands cryptography and PKI principles.

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
2 National foreword
7 CONTENTS
11 FOREWORD
13 1 Scope
2 Normative references
14 3 Terms and definitions
19 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
20 5 Cryptographic applications for power system implementations
5.1 Cryptography, cryptographic keys, and security objectives
21 5.2 Types of cryptography
5.3 Uses of cryptography
5.3.1 Goals of cyber security
22 5.3.2 Confidentiality
5.3.3 Data integrity
23 5.3.4 Authentication
5.3.5 Non-repudiation
5.3.6 Trust
24 6 Key management concepts and methods in power system operations
6.1 Key management system security policy
6.2 Key management design principles for power system operations
6.3 Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
6.4 Cryptographic key usages
25 6.5 Trust using a public-key infrastructure (PKI)
6.5.1 Registration authorities (RA)
6.5.2 Certification authority (CA)
6.5.3 Public-key certificates
26 6.5.4 Attribute certificates
6.5.5 Public-key certificate and attribute certificate extensions
Figures
Figure 1 – Relationship between public-key certificates and attribute certificates
27 6.6 Trust via non-PKI self-signed certificates
6.7 Authorization and validation lists
6.7.1 General
28 6.7.2 AVLs in non-constrained environments
6.7.3 AVLs in constrained environments
6.7.4 Use of self-signed public-key certificates in AVLs
6.8 Trust via pre-shared keys
29 6.9 Session keys
6.10 Protocols used in trust establishment
6.10.1 Certification request
6.10.2 Trust Anchor Management Protocol (TAMP)
6.10.3 Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol (SCEP)
6.10.4 Internet X.509 PKI Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
30 6.10.5 Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
6.10.6 Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST)
6.10.7 Summary view on the different protocols
31 6.11 Group keys
6.11.1 Purpose of group keys
6.11.2 Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI)
Figure 2 – Group key management distribution
32 Figure 3 – GDOI IKE Phase 1 – Authentication and securing communication channel
33 Figure 4 – GDOI Pull Phase 2
35 Figure 5 – Key renewal triggered by the entities
36 6.12 Key management lifecycle
6.12.1 Key management in the life cycle of an entity
Figure 6 – Key management in product life cycle
37 6.12.2 Cryptographic key lifecycle
Figure 7 – Simplified certificate life cycle
38 Figure 8 – Cryptographic key life cycle
39 6.13 Certificate management processes
6.13.1 Certificate management process
6.13.2 Initial certificate creation
6.13.3 Enrolment of an entity
40 Figure 9 – Example of the SCEP entity enrolment and CSR process
41 6.13.4 Certificate signing request (CSR) process
Figure 10 – Example of the EST entity enrolment and CSR process
42 6.13.5 Certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
Figure 11 – CSR processing
43 6.13.6 Online certificate status protocol (OCSP)
Figure 12 – Certificate revocation list
44 Figure 13 – Overview of the online certificate status protocol (OCSP)
45 Figure 14 – Diagram using a combination of CRL and OCSP processes
46 6.13.7 Server-based certificate validation protocol (SCVP)
6.13.8 Short-lived certificates
Figure 15 – Call Flows for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Figure 16 – Overview Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol using OCSP Backend
47 6.13.9 Certificate renewal
Figure 17 – SCEP certificate renewal
48 6.14 Alternative process for asymmetric keys generated outside the entity
Figure 18 – EST certificate renewal/rekeying
49 6.15 Key distribution for symmetric keys with different time frames
7 General key management requirements
7.1 Asymmetric and symmetric key management requirements
7.2 Required cryptographic materials
Figure 19 – Central certificate generation
50 7.3 Public-Key certificates requirements
7.4 Cryptographic key protection
7.5 Use of existing security key management infrastructure
7.6 Use of object identifiers
8 Asymmetric key management
8.1 Certificate generation and installation
8.1.1 Private and public key generation and installation
51 8.1.2 Private and public key renewal
8.1.3 Random Number Generation
8.1.4 Certificate policy
8.1.5 Entity registration for identity establishment
52 8.1.6 Entity configuration
8.1.7 Entity enrolment
53 8.1.8 Trust anchor information update
54 8.2 Public-key certificate revocation
8.3 Certificate validity
8.3.1 Validity of certificates
55 8.3.2 Certificate revocation
8.3.3 Certificate revocation status checking
8.3.4 Handling of authorization and validation lists (AVLs)
60 8.4 Certificate expiration and renewal
8.5 Secured Time Synchronization
61 9 Symmetric key management
9.1 Group based key management (GDOI)
9.1.1 GDOI requirements
9.1.2 Internet Key Exchange Version 1 (IKEv1)
Tables
Table 1 – KDC IKEv1 Requirements
62 9.1.3 Phase 1 IKEv1 main mode exchange type 2
Figure 20 – IKEv1 (RFC 2409) main mode exchange with RSA digital signatures
63 Figure 21 – IKEv1 main mode exchange and security association messages
64 Figure 22 – IKEv1 main mode exchange: key exchange messages
Figure 23 – IKEv1 Main Mode Exchange: ID authentication messages
65 9.1.4 Phase 1/2 ISAKMP informational exchange type 5
Figure 24 – IKEv1 HASH_I calculation
66 Figure 25 – Phase 1 Informational Exchange
67 9.1.5 Phase 2 GDOI GROUPKEY-PULL exchange type 32
Figure 26 – GD004FI GROUPKEY-PULL as define in RFC 6407
68 Figure 27 – GROUPKEY-PULL hash computations
69 Figure 28 – GROUPKEY-PULL initial SA request exchange
Figure 29 – RFC 6407 Identification Payload
70 Figure 30 – ID_OID Identification Data
Table 2 – IEC 61850 Object IDs: Mandatory (m) and Optional (o)
71 Figure 31 – 61850_UDP_ADDR_GOOSE/SV ASN.1 BNF
Figure 32 – IPADDRESS ASN.1 BNF
72 Figure 33 – Example IecUdpAddrPayload ASN.1 Data with DER Encoding
Figure 34 – 61850_UDP_TUNNEL Payload ASN.1 BNF
Figure 35 – 61850_ETHERNET_GOOSE/SV Payload ASN.1 BNF
73 Figure 36 – RFC 6407 SA TEK Payload
74 Figure 37 – IEC-61850 SA TEK Payload
75 9.1.6 GROUPKEY-PULL group key download exchange
Figure 38 – GROUPKEY-PULL Key Download Exchange
76 10 Connections to the IEC 62351 parts and other IEC documents
Figure 39 – IEC 62351 Part 9 relationship to other IEC 62351 parts
78 Annex A (normative)Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS)
79 Annex B (informative)Random Number Generation (RNG)
B.1 Random number generation types
B.2 Deterministic random bit generators
80 B.3 Non-deterministic random number generation
B.4 Entropy sources
81 Annex C (informative)Certificate enrolment and renewal flowcharts
C.1 Certificate enrolment
C.2 Certificate renewal
Figure C.1 – Certificate enrolment
82 Figure C.2 – Certificate renewal state machine
83 Annex D (informative)Examples of certificate profiles
84 Table D.1 – Examples of operator public-key certificates
85 Table D.2 – Examples of OEM certificates
86 Table D.3 – Example of OCSP certificate
87 Bibliography
BS EN 62351-9:2017
$215.11