1.1 General scope<\/b><\/p>\n
This Technical Specification specifies transactions and data for Compliance Checking – Secure Monitoring. The scope of this technical specification consists of:<\/p>\n
The concept and involved processes for Secure Monitoring.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
The definition of new transactions and data.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
The use of the OBE compliance checking transaction as specified in CEN ISO\/TS 12813:2009, for the purpose of Compliance Checking – Secure Monitoring.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
The use of back end transactions as specified in EN ISO 12855:2012, for the purpose of Compliance Checking \u2013 Secure Monitoring. This includes definitions for the use of optional elements and reserved attributes.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
A specification of technical and organisational security measures involved in Secure Monitoring, on top of measures provided for in the EFC Security Framework.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
The interrelations between different options in the OBE, TSP and TC domain and their high level impacts. Outside the scope of this Technical Specification are:<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Information exchange between OBE and TR.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Choices related to compliance checking policies e.g. which options are used, whether undetected\/unexpected observations are applied, whether fixed, transportable and\/or mobile compliance checking are deployed, locations and intensity of checking of itinerary freezing and checking of toll declaration.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Details of procedures and criteria for assessing the validity or plausibility of Itinerary Records.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Choices concerning the storage location of itinerary records, and data retention policy.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Recommendations for a single specific implementation due to different applicable privacy laws. Instead, a set of options is provided.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
1.2 Relation to CEN\/TS 16439<\/b><\/p>\n
Secure Monitoring can be regarded as a set of specific measures addressing a number of serious threats identified in the EFC Security Framework, namely:<\/p>\n
Threats assigned to the User agent:<\/p>\n
Manipulating the system to not register road usage.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Manipulating the system to register the wrong (lower) road usage.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Manipulating the system to lose road usage data.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
Threats assigned to Toll Service Provider agent:<\/p>\n
Modifying usage data reported from the OBE.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Suppressing reporting of road use.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Faulty interpretation of usage data.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
Wrongly configuring the front end.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nNOTE The Technical Specification EFC Security Framework (CEN\/TS 16439:2013) analyses the general requirements of the stakeholders and provides a comprehensive threat analysis for an interoperable EFC scheme. A number of identified threats may result in less revenue of the toll charger, incorrect charging and billing and not meeting required service levels between Toll Service Provider and Toll Charger. The EFC Security Framework further specifies requirements to counter the identified threats. Some of these requirements can be fulfilled by implementing basic security measures that are specified in the same document, but more specific security measures are left to other standards and specifications or to local choices.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Secure Monitoring makes use of basic cryptographic security measures and procedures provided for in the EFC Security Framework as far as possible. The relation between the EFC Security Framework and the Secure Monitoring technical specifications is illustrated in Figure 2.<\/p>\n
Based on the threat analysis that has been carried out in the EFC Security Framework, Figure 2 specifies which attacks Secure Monitoring addresses.<\/p>\n
1.3 Relation to other standards<\/b><\/p>\n
This Technical Specification complies with the allocation of roles and responsibilities as specified in ISO 17573:2010 Electronic fee collection \u2013 Systems architecture for vehicle related tolling.<\/p>\n
This Technical Specification defines transactions in the interfaces between the TSP Front end and the Toll Charger’s road side equipment (RSE) as well as between the Toll Service Providers and the Toll Chargers back end. As these interfaces are also covered by CEN ISO\/TS 12813:2009 (Compliance Checking Communication) and EN ISO 12855:2012 (Information Exchange between service provision and Toll Charging), SM_CC reuses these standards by specifying which options to choose and by defining the content of data fields. Extensions and additions are only specified in cases where it is not possible to specify the SM_CC with the tools available in these standards. The relation between this Technical Specification, the interfaces between TC and TSP and the aforementioned standards is illustrated in Figure 3 below.<\/p>\n
PDF Catalog<\/h4>\n
\n
\n PDF Pages<\/th>\n PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n \n 7<\/td>\n Foreword <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 8<\/td>\n 0 Introduction
0.1 Overview
0.2 Processes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 9<\/td>\n Figure 1 \u2014 The sub-processes of Compliance Checking (UML use case diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 10<\/td>\n 0.3 Options <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 11<\/td>\n Table 1 \u2014 Different types of Secure Monitoring <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 13<\/td>\n 0.4 Privacy aspects <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 14<\/td>\n 1 Scope
1.1 General scope
1.2 Relation to CEN\/TS 16439 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 15<\/td>\n Figure 2 \u2014 Relation between the EFC Security Framework, Secure Monitoring – Compliance Checking and Secure Monitoring – Trusted Recorder <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 16<\/td>\n 1.3 Relation to other standards
Figure 3 \u2014 Relation between Secure Monitoring \u2013 Compliance Checking, Compliance Checking Communication (CEN ISO\/TS 12813:2009) and Information Exchange between service provision and Toll Chargers (EN ISO 12855:2012)
2 Normative references <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 17<\/td>\n 3 Terms and definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 19<\/td>\n 4 Abbreviations <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 20<\/td>\n 5 Processes
5.1 Introduction and overview <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 21<\/td>\n Figure 4 \u2014 The main stakeholders and processes of Secure Monitoring (UML use case diagram)
5.2 Processes needed for different types of Secure Monitoring <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 22<\/td>\n Table 2 \u2014 Processes to be implemented by the TSP
Table 3 \u2014 Processes to be implemented by the TC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 23<\/td>\n 5.3 Itinerary Freezing
5.3.1 Introduction
Figure 5 \u2014 The sub-processes of Itinerary Freezing (UML use case diagram)
5.3.2 Generate Itinerary <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 25<\/td>\n 5.3.3 Real-time freezing
Figure 6 \u2014 The sub-processes of Itinerary Freezing in Real-Time (UML use case diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 26<\/td>\n 5.3.4 Freezing per declaration
Figure 7 \u2014 The sub-processes of Itinerary Freezing per Declaration (UML use case diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 27<\/td>\n 5.4 Checking of Itinerary Freezing
5.4.1 Introduction
Figure 8 \u2014 The sub processes of Checking Itinerary Freezing (UML use case diagram)
5.4.2 Observing a vehicle <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 28<\/td>\n 5.4.3 Retrieving Proof of Itinerary Freezing (PIF)
Figure 9 \u2014 The sub processes of Retrieving Proof of Itinerary Freezing (UML use case diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 29<\/td>\n 5.4.4 Checking PIF against Observation
5.5 Checking of Toll Declaration
5.5.1 Introduction
Figure 10 \u2014 The sub processes of Checking of Toll Declaration (UML use case diagram)
5.5.2 Retrieve Itinerary Data <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 30<\/td>\n 5.5.3 Check Itinerary Consistency
5.5.4 Checking Toll Declaration against Itinerary <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 31<\/td>\n 5.6 Claiming incorrectness
5.7 Providing EFC Context Data
5.8 Key Management
5.8.1 Introduction
5.8.2 Requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 32<\/td>\n Table 4 \u2014 overview of keys in the SM_CC context
6 Transactions
6.1 Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 33<\/td>\n Figure 11 \u2014 Overview of relations between procedures and supporting transactions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 34<\/td>\n Table 5 \u2014 Rules for transactions for the information exchanges between Toll Chargers’ and Toll Service Providers’ Back Ends
6.2 Description of Itinerary Data
6.2.1 Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 35<\/td>\n Figure 12 \u2014 The information objects of ItineraryBatchRtf (UML class diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 36<\/td>\n Figure 13 \u2014 The information objects of ItineraryBatchFpd (UML class diagram)
6.2.2 Itinerary Batch <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 37<\/td>\n 6.2.3 Itinerary Record Data Elements
6.2.3.1 Introduction
6.2.3.2 Common Data Elements for all Itinerary Records
6.2.3.3 Common data elements for Itinerary Records frozen in real-time <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 38<\/td>\n Table 6 \u2014 Data elements used for input for the calculation of the authenticator data element
6.2.3.4 Common data elements for Context Independent Itinerary Records <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 39<\/td>\n 6.2.3.5 Common data elements for Context Dependent Itinerary Records \u2013 Detected Charge Object
6.2.3.6 Common data elements for Context Dependent Itinerary Records \u2013 Number of detected Events
6.3 Retrieving PIF in real-time (DSRC Transaction)
6.3.1 Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 40<\/td>\n 6.3.2 Transactional Model
Figure 14 \u2014 The messages of Checking of Itinerary Freezing in real-time synchronous transaction (UML sequence diagram)
6.3.3 Syntax and Semantics <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 41<\/td>\n Table 7 \u2014 CCC-ContextMark structure for SM_CC
Table 8 \u2014 SM_CC Attributes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 42<\/td>\n 6.3.4 Security
6.4 Toll Declaration
6.4.1 Introduction
6.4.2 Transactional Model
Figure 15 \u2014 Typical exchange of messages in the Toll Declaration asynchronous transaction, initiated by TSP (UML sequence diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 43<\/td>\n 6.4.3 Syntax and semantics
Figure 16 \u2014 The information objects of TollDeclarationADU (UML class diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 44<\/td>\n 6.4.4 Itinerary Sequence
Figure 17 \u2014 The information objects of ItinerarySequenceFpD and ItinerarySequenceRtf (UML class diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 45<\/td>\n Figure 18 \u2014 Overview of how the TollDeclarationADU, the itinerary sequence structures and the itinerary batch structures are connected by hashes and authenticators (UML class diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 46<\/td>\n 6.4.5 Security
6.5 Back End Data Checking
6.5.1 Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 47<\/td>\n 6.5.2 Transactional model
Figure 19 \u2014 Typical exchange of messages in the Checking of Toll Declaration asynchronous transaction, initiated by TC (UML sequence diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 48<\/td>\n 6.5.3 Checks of the Itinerary <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 49<\/td>\n 6.5.4 Syntax and semantics
Figure 20 \u2014 The information objects of RetrieveItineraryCheckADU (UML class diagram). Generalization (hollow arrow) used to represent the ASN.1 construct CHOICE (observation or tollDomainCounter) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 51<\/td>\n Figure 21 \u2014 The information objects of ItineraryCheckADU (UML class diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 52<\/td>\n Table 9 \u2014 Present data fields in an instance of ItineraryCheckingADU
6.5.5 Security
6.6 Claiming incorrectness
6.6.1 Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 53<\/td>\n 6.6.2 Transactional model
Figure 22 \u2014 Exchange of messages in the Claiming Incorrectness asynchronous transaction (UML sequence diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 54<\/td>\n 6.6.3 Syntax and semantics
Figure 23 \u2014 The information objects of SmccClaimADU (UML class diagram)
6.6.4 Security <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 55<\/td>\n 6.7 Providing EFC Context Data
6.7.1 Introduction
6.7.2 Transactional Model
Figure 24 \u2014 Typical exchange of messages in the Originating and Providing EFC Context Data (initiated by TC) asynchronous transaction (UML sequence diagram)
6.7.3 Syntax and semantics <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 56<\/td>\n Figure 25 \u2014 The information objects of EfcContextDataSmccADU (UML class diagram) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 57<\/td>\n 6.7.4 Security
7 Security
7.1 Security functions and elements
7.1.1 Hash functions
7.1.2 MAC
7.1.3 Digital signatures
7.1.4 Public Keys, Certificates and CRL <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 58<\/td>\n 7.2 Key Management
7.2.1 Key Exchange between Stakeholders
7.2.2 Key generation and certification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 59<\/td>\n 7.3 Trusted Recorder and SM_CC Verification SAM characteristics
7.3.1 Introduction
7.3.2 Trusted Recorder <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 60<\/td>\n 7.3.3 SM_CC Verification SAM <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 61<\/td>\n Annex A (normative) Data type specification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 69<\/td>\n Annex B (normative) Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
B.1 Guidance for completing the PICS proforma
B.1.1 Purposes and structure
B.1.2 Abbreviations and conventions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 71<\/td>\n B.1.3 Instructions for completing the PICS proforma
B.2 Identification of the implementation
B.2.1 General
B.2.2 Date of the statement
B.2.3 Implementation Under Test (IUT) identification
B.2.4 System Under Test (SUT) identification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 72<\/td>\n B.2.5 Product supplier
B.2.6 Applicant (if different from product supplier)
B.2.7 PICS contact person <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 73<\/td>\n B.3 Identification of the protocol
B.4 Global statement of conformance
B.5 Roles
Table B.1 \u2014 Roles
B.6 Types of Secure Monitoring <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 74<\/td>\n Table B.2 \u2014 Types of Secure Monitoring
B.7 Capabilities and conditions
Table B.3 \u2014 Capabilities and conditions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 75<\/td>\n B.8 Processes
Table B.4 \u2014 Processes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 76<\/td>\n Annex C (informative) Example transactions
Table C.1 \u2014 Example SM_CC transaction with CIIR read-out <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 77<\/td>\n Table C.2 \u2014 Example combined CCC and SM_CC transaction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 79<\/td>\n Table C.3 \u2014 Example optimised combined CCC and SM_CC transaction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 80<\/td>\n Annex D (informative) Addressed threats (in CEN\/TS 16439)
D.1 Introduction
D.2 Threats where Secure Monitoring can provide Security Measures
Table D.1 \u2014 EFC Security Framework threats where Secure Monitoring can provide Security Measures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 82<\/td>\n D.3 Related Requirements
Table D.2 \u2014 EFC Security Framework Requirements related to Secure Monitoring relevant threats <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 83<\/td>\n D.4 Related Security Measures
Table D.3 \u2014 EFC Security Framework Security Measures related to Secure Monitoring relevant requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 86<\/td>\n Annex E (informative) Essentials of the SM_CC concept
E.1 Introduction
E.2 The SM_CC concept \u2013 FAQs <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 88<\/td>\n E.3 SM_CC options
E.3.1 SM_CC_1 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 89<\/td>\n Figure E.1 \u2014 Illustration of the concept of itinerary freezing in real-time <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 90<\/td>\n Figure E.2 \u2014 Illustration of the concept of checking of itinerary freezing in real-time <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 92<\/td>\n Figure E.3 \u2014 Illustration of the concept of checking of toll declaration
E.3.2 SM_CC_2 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 93<\/td>\n Figure E.4 \u2014 Illustration of the concept of itinerary freezing in real-time using a TR with trusted time source <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 94<\/td>\n Figure E.5 \u2014 Illustration of the concept of delayed checking of itinerary freezing using a TR with trusted time source <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 95<\/td>\n E.3.3 SM_CC_3a
Figure E.6 \u2014 Illustration of the concept of freezing per declaration <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 97<\/td>\n Figure E.7 \u2014 Illustration of the concept of checking of itinerary freezing in case of itinerary freezing per declaration
E.3.4 SM_CC_3b <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 98<\/td>\n E.4 Managing multiple toll domains
E.4.1 Overlapping toll domains
Figure E.8 \u2014 Illustration of neighbouring and overlapping toll domains <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 100<\/td>\n E.4.2 The \u2018catch-all\u2019 toll domain counter <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 101<\/td>\n Annex F (informative) Use of this Technical Specification for the EETS
F.1 General
F.2 Overall relationship between European standardization and the EETS
F.3 European standardization work supporting the EETS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 102<\/td>\n F.4 Correspondence between this technical specification and the EETS
Table F.1 \u2014 Technical requirements of SM_CC in relation to 2009\/750\/EC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\n 103<\/td>\n Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Electronic fee collection. Secure monitoring for autonomous toll system – Compliance checking<\/b><\/p>\n
\n\n
\n Published By<\/td>\n Publication Date<\/td>\n Number of Pages<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n BSI<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n 2014<\/td>\n 106<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":231150,"template":"","meta":{"rank_math_lock_modified_date":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false},"product_cat":[698,2641],"product_tag":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-231144","1":"product","2":"type-product","3":"status-publish","4":"has-post-thumbnail","6":"product_cat-35-240-60","7":"product_cat-bsi","9":"first","10":"instock","11":"sold-individually","12":"shipping-taxable","13":"purchasable","14":"product-type-simple"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product\/231144","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/product"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/231150"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=231144"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"product_cat","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product_cat?post=231144"},{"taxonomy":"product_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product_tag?post=231144"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}